The Police Order: The Right to Disobey by Rachlin, Carl C.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 6 | Number 1 Article 14
1-1-1965
The Police Order: The Right to Disobey
Carl C. Rachlin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Carl C. Rachlin, The Police Order: The Right to Disobey, 6 Santa Clara Lawyer 136 (1965).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol6/iss1/14
THE POLICE ORDER:
THE RIGHT TO DISOBEY
Carl Rachlint
INTRODUCTION
Now pending before the United States Supreme Court' is a case
awaiting ruling on the petition for certiorari in which one of the de-
fendants, a judge in a lower criminal court in Mississippi, was asked
during his deposition whether a citizen has the right to disobey an
unreasonable police order. His answer was that he thought the citizen
should obey the officer and later seek redress.2 Many courts have
rendered decisions which throw doubt on the accuracy of this judge's
opinion of the law. Such an opinion of the state of the law would not
be important, except perhaps to persons convicted, were it not shared
by many District Attorneys, police officers, and even high level
judges.
During the argument in a case heard recently by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey' the following exchange took place as reported
in the press.4 The defense attorney was quoted as saying, "a person
has a public duty to refuse to obey an illegal police order." Chief
Justice Joseph Weintraub's answer was, "You'd have anarchy if you
didn't have order." To this the defense attorney replied, "It's a
police state otherwise."
This exchange between the Chief Judge and counsel represents
a polarization of the opposing views; on one hand, the need for just
order, and on the other hand, the maintenance of individual liberty.
Unless this polarization is understood, and the problems of law ana-
lyzed, society may unwittingly travel a road along which return is
difficult and which may be destructive of personal liberty. To oppose
a police state, i.e. a state in which the direction of the policeman
automatically has the force of law, one need not propose anarchy;
nor need one be ignorant of the difficulties encountered by the police
t A.B., 1937, University College, New York University; LL.B., 1940, Harvard
University; General Counsel, Congress of Racial Equality; Legal Director of
Scholarship, Education, and Defense Fund for Racial Equality.
I wish to express my deep gratitude to Stephen Schlakman, a second year student
at the Columbia University School of Law without whose able assistance this article
could not have been written.
1 Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965).
2 Id. at 217.
3 State v. Smith, No. A-753-64, Super. Ct. N.J., 1965.
4 Robinson, Court Debate: What Is an Illegal Disturbance, Newark Star Ledger,
Dec. 22, 1965.
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to assert that not every order of the police is sacrosanct. Individual
liberty allows for occasions when one may have a right, perhaps even
a duty, to disobey an improper order. By living in a democratic so-
ciety we have before us the responsibility to constantly make deci-
sions of varying importance, many of which affect us, some directly,
others tangentially. Correlative with the right to make decisions is
the duty to accept responsibility for those decisions. Having made
a choice to disobey a police order believing it to be improper, one
must accept the responsibility for such act should he be in error.
Totalitarian States Require Obedience
In a Communist or Fascist state, the citizen-subject understands
his duties and, whether he likes it or not, obeys the police order. The
citizen-subject accordingly has little power and consequentially
little responsibility. Rarely is the issue whether the citizen or police-
man is wrong or right, but rather whether the citizen did as he was
told. While this may be an over-simplification, our knowledge of
these societies indicates its general truth. On the other hand, a free
society will inquire whether the citizen obeyed or refused to obey
the police order and, equally important, whether the police had the
right to make such an order.
From the examples stated above, it is submitted that a certain
misunderstanding exists in this area of the law. Too often decisions
are based upon the special facts of the particular case, not on an
adequate understanding of the underlying principles of law and the
mutual responsibilities and obligations of police and citizen. Civil
Rights cases involving these underlying questions of the relation
between police and citizen are often won in behalf of the expansion
of civil rights merely because there is unequal treatment on the part
of the police (in many areas) toward Negroes and Caucasians.
No less important, and perhaps even more fundamental, is the
issue of the right of the police to ask "X" to "move on" because
rarely is there an adequate inquiry into underlying relationships.
It is not unusual for an appellate court to reverse a conviction based
on a refusal to "move on," but again the reversals are not based on
an adequate understanding of the underlying principles, but on racial
discrimination alone. Unless the fundamental question of the police-
citizen relation is examined, the present civil rights legal battles may
have to be followed by new battles for personal liberty. Once the
"prop" of unequal racial treatment, upon which convictions for
refusing to obey an improper order of the police are reversed, is re-
moved, convictions for disobeying police orders come as a matter
of course, unanimously affirmed, as discussed later in this article.
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Important as it may be that the word of the police in a democ-
racy not have the force of law, it is no less important to understand
that there does not exist any broad right to ignore police directions.
In a Communist or Fascist state, one merely obeys. In a democracy,
one has the opportunity and may have the duty to make a decision
concerning the propriety of obeying a police order. But not to be
forgotten is the possibility that punishment may follow from making
the wrong decision.
THE ORDER TO "MOVE ON"
Let us start with the premise that the lot of the policeman is
not a happy one. To react quickly to myriad situations, and to judge
the merits of problems accurately, many of which come unexpectedly,
is part of the duty of the conscientious policeman. Some flexibility
in the decision-making power has to be his. Abstractly, of course,
one may agree that his will should not be beyond question, particu-
larly when the issue concerns the white middle-class milieu. To allow
the police officer to act upon his discretion and yet be restrained
in a manner we deem proper is a problem requiring delicate balanc-
ing, with proper order and individual freedom on the scales. Whether
a man has struck another or stolen his watch are questions reason-
ably subject to objective analysis. But the right of the police to arrest
one for failing to "move on" is not open to such factual analysis,
since the issue often arises when one is merely standing, doing noth-
ing. What motivates the policeman's acts about a given possibility of
street obstruction, including such factors as his judgment and timid-
ity, his prejudices, and how much of the situation he has really seen,
are the unknowns that cause our concern.
Where a police officer orders a person or a group to move on or to
disperse, most courts hold that failure to comply is obstruction or
resistance .... Typically opinions treating fact situations of these types
offer no ... statement of broad, guiding principle, but rather conclude
without analysis that the conduct is punishable. Courts which have been
faced with the problem indicate a split as to whether behavior of this
type is punishable either as disorderly conduct or a breach of the
peace.5
Such lax analysis is indeed harmful to our society, for "our liberties
might be seriously threatened if an individual could be punished for
refusal to obey an order of a policeman or other officer of the state
transcending his lawful authority."6 Despite these statements no
careful delineation of the duties of the police officer nor of his lawful
authority has been made and the courts are still lax in their analysis
5 Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 388, 401 (1960).
6 People v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279, 281, 181 N.E. 572, 83 A.L.R. 785 (1932).
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even when the decision reverses a conviction. Unfamiliarity with
current laws is common among police officers.' The attitude com-
monly taken by the courts is a matter of grave concern. Anarchy is
not the inevitable result of the right of the free citizen to question
authority,8 despite a common expectation to that effect.
Important as the problem is, it has not escaped the eye of the
United States Supreme Court. But in reversing convictions in recent
cases, the Court has avoided clarifying the right of an individual to
disobey a police officer's unwarranted order to move on. By basing
decisions on narrower grounds, the Court has chosen not to come to
grips with the fundamental issue of the rights and limitations of dis-
obeying a police order. Because of an apparent inconsistency in the
courts, i.e. Civil Rights cases are treated differently from other situa-
tions, it is urged that an attempt be made to establish a general rule
instead of continuing to decide cases in an ad hoc fashion as reactions
to particular errors of the police in civil rights situations.
Principles Established by Case Law
Much of the present thinking in this area derives from People
v. Galpern,a a New York case that attracted little attention when
decided. Galpern, a practicing attorney, emerged near midnight on a
summer evening from a meeting in New York City and in the age-
old fashion stopped to have a quiet chat (or "schmoose" as it is called
in New York) with friends on the sidewalk. At this time, the tran-
script states that he was approached by Officer Falchiere, who said
to the "schmoosers," "move on"; in his judgment, this group was
obstructing the sidewalk since other similar "schmoosers" were
standing nearby. When, after a quiet and orderly dispute, attorney
Galpern continued to refuse to move, he was arrested by Officer
Falchiere for violation of Section 722(3) of the New York Penal
Law.10 The following express findings were made by the Magistrate:
I find that the defendant used no threatening, abusive, or insulting
language. That his behavior was not insulting or threatening, and he
7 TOWLER, THnE PoLIcE ROLE IN RACIAL CONFLICTS 15 (1964). When this book was
written, Mr. Towler was Commanding Officer of the Danville, Virginia Detective
Bureau.
8 WEBSTERs THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961) defines anarchy as,
"absence or denial of any authority, established order, or ruling power."
9 259 N.Y. 279, 181 N.E. 572, 83 A.L.R. 785 (1932).
10 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722(3). The statute provides: "Any person who with intent
to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned,
commits any of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense
of disorderly conduct: . . . (3) Congregates with others on a public street and refuses
to move when ordered by the police." In New York, disorderly conduct (§ 722) is
not a crime but an offense, although the penalties can be severe.
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had no intent to provoke a breach of the peace. But I do find that he
obstructed the sidewalk with a number of other unknown men, and re-fused to move on when ordered by the police officer, and that the
officer, in my opinion, was acting within his rights in placing the defen-
dant under arrest. I find defendant guilty."
Without a dissent,'" the affirming opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals, written by Judge Irving Lehman, a jurist of sound
reputation, points out that policemen "are called upon to determine
both the occasion for and the nature of such directions. Reasonable
discretion must, in such matters, be left to them and only when they
exceed that discretion do they transcend their authority and departfrom their duty."'" Upon finding that the defendant's conduct fell
within the statutory definition of disorderly conduct, and that thepolice officer's interference was authorized, the opinion goes on
to say:
A refusal to obey such an order can be justified only where the circum-
stances show conclusively that the police officer's direction was purely
arbitrary and was not calculated in any way to promote the public
order. That is not the case here. The courts cannot weigh opposing
considerations as to the wisdom of the police officer's directions when
a police officer is called upon to decide whether the time has come in
which some directions are called for. 14
Whether the decision would have been the same if Justice Car-dozo had taken part and whether, in light of some of the recent civil
rights decisions referred to below, the opposite conclusion would havebeen reached, is pure speculation; the impact of the opinion's think-ing is with us. Although factual situations are of major importance
to the ultimate decisions, specific factual findings nevertheless are not
made in Galpern. The Lehman opinion stated as a fact that Galpern'sgroup consisted of six or seven persons.'" But the magistrate made
no findings of fact concerning the number of persons in the group;' 6
the record merely contains some contradictory evidence. OfficerFalchiere first testified that the group consisted of six people 7 but
later testified that it consisted of seven.' Yet both the defendant
and witness Kitzes testified that none besides themselves constituted
this group at the time the officer approached the defendant.'9
11 Record, p. 30. It does seem strange that the court expressly said Galpern had
no intent to commit a breach of the peace, and made no reference to the possible
occasioning of such a breach, yet still found Galpern guilty.12 Justice Cardozo heard the argument but did not take part in the decision.
13 People v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279, 281-82, 181 N.E. 572, 83 A.L.R. 785, 786
(1932).
14 Id. at 284-85, 181 N.E. at 574, 83 A.L.R. at 788. [Emphasis added.]15 Id. at 284, 181 N.E. at 573, 83 A.L.R. at 787.
16 Id. at 281, 181 N.E. at 572, 83 A.L.R. at 786.
17 Record, p. 13.
18 Record, p. 24.
19 Record, p. 18 (Galpern), p. 28 (Kitzes).
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In a later case, People v. Carcel,2 ° the same court stated that
under Section 72221 (under which Galpern was convicted) there
must be no fewer than three persons to constitute a group. From
Carcel we can see the importance of a determination of this disputed
factual issue. Yet in Galpern the magistrate chose not to make a
specific finding on this factual issue, and the Court of Appeals ap-
parently merely accepted the testimony of Officer Falchiere. No
findings were made as to the size of the sidewalk, or as to the number
of other persons on the sidewalk. The importance of these facts to a
finding of obstruction is obvious, yet the court did not see fit to en-
lighten itself. But these criticisms, in the light of what Galpern
stands for, are perhaps picayune, and do not advance our analysis.
No objective evidence existed that the sidewalk's use for pedestrian
passage was unreasonably obstructed, nor is there any evidence of
any complaint to the police officer, nor is there any evidence that any
pedestrian had difficulty using the sidewalk. Except for some general
allusions by Officer Falchiere, no evidence was submitted upon which
to base a finding that the street was unreasonably obstructed.
Despite the failure to produce any evidence of obstruction, the
testimony of Officer Falchiere was sufficient to neutralize the testi-
mony of Galpern, his brother, and Kitzes and to cause Galpern's
conviction. Admittedly the trier of facts should have broad leeway
as to the credibility of witnesses. Nevertheless, when so little evi-
dence of guilt existed and especially when the judge recognized that
Galpern had no intent to commit a breach of the peace, should one
not ask whether in fact the order of the officer has not achieved the
force of law irrebuttable except for the rare circumstances where the
officer is shown to be arbitrary? From the quotation of Judge Leh-
man quoted above,22 a presumption in favor of the police testimony
is rebuttable (it is not put in the terms of a presumption) although
just barely so. To see any wrongful conduct in Galpern is very diffi-
cult, unless the refusal to obey the order in and of itself was wrong-
ful.
Subsequent New York Court of Appeals cases are not of much
help as to whether such a presumption exists de facto if not actually
de jure. A per curiam opinion, in which the only material fact stated
was the reference to the defendant's conviction under subsection
three of Section 722,3 was issued by the court in People v. Gaskin24
to dismiss the information for failure to establish guilt beyond a
20 3 N.Y.2d 327, 144 N.E.2d 81, 165 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1957).
21 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722.
22 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
23 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722(3).
24 306 N.Y. 837, 118 N.E.2d 903 (1954).
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reasonable doubt. Since we may presume that the arresting officer
testified at the trial, even this skimpy appellate report demonstrates
at least some dissatisfaction with the Galpern presumption.
A year later the same court dismissed, again with a per curiam
opinion, the information in People v. Auslander2 The factual cir-
cumstances of the case were that the defendant, a sixteen-year-old
schoolboy, while talking with some friends outside a pizza palace
where he had ordered and was waiting for two pizza pies, was told
by a police officer (as was the entire group) to move on. Except for
defendant, who insisted upon his right to wait for his pizza, all others
in the group moved on. He was told by the police that unless he
moved to the inside of the "palace" he would be arrested. Express-
ing his feelings with exuberance the defendant refused to move from
his spot. To no one's surprise he was arrested after he further de-
fended his right not to be ordered to move (something that Galpern,
who was very gentlemanly, did not do). In reversing by merely citing
the Gaskin case, the Court did not take the trouble to discuss the
basis for its decision, much less discuss the fundamental issue of
whether the policeman had the right under these circumstances to
order one to move.
No less important in the long run is the policy upon which the
Galpern decision is premised. Dormant in the Galpern decision lies
a view expressed by Justice Black in his concurring opinion in Cox
v. Louisiana:26 "A state statute [that is sufficiently definite] ...
regulating conduct . . . as distinguished from speech, would in my
judgment be constitutional . ,,." Because this view is stated so
broadly and draws such a sharp distinction between the protections
afforded speech and those afforded conduct, it is open to serious
question. It is quite simple to argue (although not in this paper at
this time) that the communication of ideas which freedom of speech
seeks to foster, can often be accomplished far more dramatically
through peaceful, reasonable conduct rather than through a dull
sermon. To separate the rights that attach to conduct from the rights
that attach to speech is to draw an unreal distinction between equally
important and only slightly different means of expression. And so,
by his stand in Cox, the venerable Justice Black is led to a position
in which people who stand absolutely silent in a public library can
be arrested for breach of the peace since their protest against segre-
gation was action not speech.28
25 308 N.Y. 977, 127 N.E.2d 339 (1955).
26 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
27 Id. at 577.
28 See Brown v. Louisiana, 86 Sup. Ct. 719, 736 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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The Significance of the Galpern Decision
Although Galpern is a questionable decision, it has exerted a
powerful influence on the law in this area. The evidentiary presump-
tion, bordering on irrebuttability, that the policeman's testimony is
conclusive not only of the facts but also of his authority to issue the
order, subject only to the exceptional case where it can be affirma-
tively demonstrated that the order was purely arbitrary, has been one
of its important progeny. Instead of the burden remaining with the
prosecution to prove all the details of the alleged wrong-doing, the
burden appears to shift to the defendant to explain and defend why
he did not move on. 9
Understanding the danger referred to above, Judge Cates of the
Alabama Court of Appeals, in the course of his concurring opinion
in Shelton v. City of Birmingham, ° wrote:
I consider the burden was on the city to show, to the required degree,
the need to regulate and also the reasonableness of the means of
regulation .... I do not think there should be any legal (or factual)
presumption merely from the action of the police in temporarily closing
the street (or a part of it) to the public.8'
And in Middlebrooks v. City of Birmingham,2 he clarified his posi-
tion by stating:
Until directed otherwise by a higher holding, I continue to stick by
what I said in Shelton and consider that the prosecution must show
administrative or jurisdictional facts sufficient to support a policeman's
order to move on .... This requirement I consider to be not only one
of due process, but of necessity for the sake of guidance of the police-
men.83
Few judges have seen the issue as sharply as has Judge Cates;
even under circumstances whereby the citizen might win his case.
Not only are the views of Judge Cates not shared by most courts,
they are not accepted by his own court. At the time Officer Cashett
arrested Shelton, the latter had disobeyed three orders to move from
a street previously closed for public use by the police during a racial
demonstration. By contending that Shelton was urging the crowd on
29 But see CAL. EviD. CODE § 664 effective Jan. 1, 1967. The section states:
"Official duty regularly performed. It is presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed. This presumption does not apply on an issue as to the lawfulness of an
arrest if it is found or otherwise established that the arrest was made without a
warrant." [Emphasis added.]
80 42 Ala. App. 371, 165 So. 2d 912 (1964). Conviction based on § 1231 of
Birmingham General City Code which reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person to
refuse or fail to comply with any lawful order, signal or direction of a police officer."
81 Id. at 373, 165 So. 2d at 913 (concurring opinion).
82 42 Ala. App. 525, 170 So. 2d 424 (1964).
88 Id. at 527, 170 So. 2d at 426, n.3.
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the sidewalk to upset the barrier and go into the closed street when
he refused the police order, the prosecution persuaded the court of
Shelton's guilt. The defendant had claimed he was beckoning to his
nephew and that he moved when directed to move, only to be called
back and arrested. While not developed in the decision in Shelton, a
careful reading of Middlebrook indicates that there was a split of
opinion in Shelton as to the sufficiency of a policeman's order in itself
to establish a prima facie case. Apparently, the majority of two be-
lieved that the mere showing of the order and defendant's refusal to
obey it was itself sufficient to support a conviction in the absence of
an affirmative defense that the order was arbitrary. On the other
hand, Judge Cates believes that additionally the state must make
some showing of the reasonableness of the order before a conviction
can be obtained.
That an officer is prima facie correct in giving his order to move
on is perhaps better illustrated in Tinsley v. City of Richmond.4
Although the defendant was in no way a part of a labor demonstra-
tion in front of Thalheimer's Department Store, she was arrested
while waiting on the sidewalk nearby for a friend. She was charged
with failing to move on when ordered to do so by a policeman. Con-
viction was obtained under Richmond's very broad ordinance35 and
a unanimous Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing Galpern
as a precedent. Review was declined by the United State Supreme
Court. 6
What opportunity is left to rebut the presumption of guilt dis-
appears, for practical purposes, under this rigid Richmond ordinance.
Either one moves upon direction by the police or one is guilty. It is
difficult to see anything else in Tinsley. It is an unredeeming case.
What can be said for an ordinance which equates loitering with stand-
ing on the street? No distinction is drawn regardless of the number
of parties or the size of the group. What can be said of the Virginia
Supreme Court which does not see the anti-libertarian nature of the
ordinance? Whatever its intent, by declining review in a case as bold
as Tinsley, the United States Supreme Court has encouraged the
idea that the order of a policeman to move on must be obeyed. Al-
though in Galpern there was at least a finding of obstruction on the
street, Galpern, without the obstruction, has become the supporting
"prop" for Tinsley.
34 202 Va. 707, 119 S.E.2d 488 (1961).
35 RIcEmOND, VA., CrrY CODE § 24-17 (1957) says: "Any person loitering or
standing on the street, sidewalk or curb, shall move on or separate when required to
do so by any member of the Police Bureau and shall cease to occupy such position
on the street, sidewalk, or curb."
36 368 U.S. 18 (1961).
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Further support for this view of Galpern came in Drews v.
State.87 Because they chose not to leave a privately owned amuse-
ment park that regularly excluded Negroes, a Negro woman and
three white friends were convicted on the charge of disorderly con-
duct. 8 Upon receipt of a police order to leave, they chose to remain.
Since the police order was not purely arbitrary the Maryland high
court affirmed the conviction. 9 Although the United States Supreme
Court sent the case back for reconsideration,4" the Maryland court
reinstated its former verdict.4 The United States Supreme Court,
despite the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, then dismissed
the appeal for want of jurisdiction, over the strong protest of Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Douglas." By declining review and thus
making no decision on the merits, the Supreme Court has further
encouraged the doctrine extrapolated from Galpern, namely that
one must move when told.
The Application to Picketing
This doctrine from Galpern, that one must move when told by
the police, has been applied against pickets told by police to picket
elsewhere. In Scott v. District of Columbia,4 even though the prose-
cution did not prove an actual or impending breach of the peace, the
demonstrators were convicted under the applicable statute44 for re-
fusing to move from the Northwest gate of the White House to what
is considered the normal White House picketing area. Their con-
victions were affirmed. One year later another court affirmed a dis-
37 224 Md. 186, 167 A.2d 341, vacated, 378 U.S. 547, 236 Md. 349, 204 A.2d
64 (1964).
88 MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 123 (1957) makes culpable "... acting in a dis-
orderly manner to the disturbance of the public peace."
39 Drews v. State, 224 Md. 186, 167 A.2d 341 (1961).
40 378 U.S. 547 (1964).
41 236 Md. 349, 204 A.2d 64 (1964).
42 381 U.S. 421 (1965). The dissenting opinion, at 430-31, states the case as
follows: "Juretha Joyner, a Negro, went with some friends to celebrate 'All Nations
Day' at Gwynn Oak Park. Despite the facts that she behaved with complete order
and dignity, and that her right to be at the park is protected by federal law, she
was asked to leave, solely because of her race. She refused and, upon being handcuffed,
displayed some reluctance (though no active resistance to being pulled through an
actively hostile mob. For this she was convicted of 'acting in a disorderly manner, to
the disturbance of the public peace.' Today the Court declines to review her convic-
tion, and the convictions of her three companions. I cannot join."
43 184 A.2d 849 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962).
44 D.C. CODE § 22-1121(2) (1961) which says: "Whoever, with intent to provoke
a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be
occasioned thereby . .. congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move
on when ordered by the police shall be fined not more than $250 or imprisoned not
more than ninety days, or both." As can be seen, the language in this ordinance
practically tracks the language in the Galpern statute. This is true of many of the
state statutes.
1966]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
orderly conduct conviction where the evidence indicated that three
defendants (out of forty picketers) refused to obey the policemen's
order to move the picket line so as to occupy only one-half of the
sidewalk.4"
Civil Rights Cases Distinguished
Not surprisingly, however, when a First Amendment freedom,
in a civil rights context, is denied by the application of the Galpern
evidentiary (almost irrebuttable) presumption, the United States
Supreme Court has not been so willing to permit the power of the
police to order one to move on regardless of the circumstances. In
Edwards v. South Carolina,4" the defendants, 187 Negroes, while
peacefully demonstrating against racial discrimination, marched
through the State House grounds, normally open to the public,
in a manner previously approved by the police officials. No disorder
or blocking of traffic occurred, although a group gathered to watch
the protest. When ordered by the police to disperse, the demonstra-
tors, not moving, were arrested for breach of the peace; they refused
to "break it up."47 Despite the dissent's view that the dispersal "re-
quest" was "reasonable" under the circumstances,48 and despite a
failure by the majority to find that the order was arbitrary (although
they doubted its reasonableness), the Supreme Court's opinion con-
cluded:
... [I]t is clear to us that in arresting, convicting, and punishing the
petitioners under the circumstances disclosed by this record, South
Carolina infringed the petitioners' constitutionally protected rights of
free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of
their grievances. 49
The Court reversed the convictions, deciding that the interpretation
of "breach of the peace" by the courts of South Carolina was un-
constitutionally broad.50 One would think that the decision might
throw light on the Galpern doctrine, but at no time did the Court
45 City of Chicago v. Williams, 45 Ill. App. 2d 327, 195 N.E.2d 425 (1963).
46 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
47 The Court did not quote the applicable statute.
48 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 241 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
49 Id. at 235.
50 The courts of South Carolina had defined "breach of the peace" as follows:
"In general terms, a breach of the peace is a violation of public order, a disturbance of
the public tranquility, by an act or conduct inciting to violence .... If what is done
is unjustifiable and unlawful, tending with sufficient directness to break the peace, no
more is required." Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 234 (1963). Compare
the definition recently set down in California: "The public peace is disturbed when the
acts complained of disturb public peace or tranquility enjoyed by members of a
community where good order reigns among its members or where acts are likely to
produce violence or where acts cause consternation and alarm in the community."
People v. Green, 234 Cal. App. 2d 871, 873, 44 Cal. Rptr. 438, 439 (1965).
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refer either to Galpern or any of its progeny, nor did it discuss the
power of the police to order one to "move on."
By questioning the propriety of an order and holding the inter-
pretation of "breach of the peace" unconstitutionally vague, the
United States Supreme Court, not long after Edwards, reversed con-
victions in Cox v. Louisiana.5 A CORE protest on the sidewalk
across the street from the courthouse in Baton Rouge, where it had
been directed to demonstrate by the chief of police, was led by the
Reverend B. Elton Cox. As in many such buildings throughout the
United States, the courthouse is the home for not only all the local
hangers-on and domino players but also houses other public offices
in addition to the court. Shortly prior to this demonstration, several
Negro students had been picketing to increase Negro employment
for the Christmas holidays. When Cox told his students, who were
demonstrating against the arrests of the day before, that it was time
to eat,' the sheriff, with rare intuition (Garner v. Louisiana52 had
been decided a few days before), deemed such a direction inflamma-
tory, and ordered the demonstrators to disperse. When they did not,
he directed the police to use teargas to disperse the students and Mr.
Cox. The defendant's conviction for breach of the peace53 (affirmed
by the lower courts) was unanimously reversed. Again, none of the
opinions referred to the sheriff's order as purely arbitrary, nor did
they discuss questions raised by Galpern.
In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,54 the Galpern evidentiary pre-
sumption was ignored even though there were facts similar to those
in Galpern. The Supreme Court relied upon the susceptibility of the
applicable Birmingham ordinance being unconstitutionally applied
to an event occurring immediately after a civil rights demonstration.
The Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, one of the leaders of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference and a man well known to readers
of the reports of the United States Supreme Court, was standing on
the sidewalk in front of a department store talking with friends upon
conclusion of the demonstration. The group refused to move on when
so directed by a Birmingham police officer. After a second order all
had moved except Mr. Shuttlesworth; at this juncture the officer ar-
rested him. In reversing the almost inevitable conviction, 55 the
51 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
52 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
53 Defendant convicted under LA. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 103.1 (Supp. 1962), which
defines the crime as congregating with others, "with intent to provoke a breach of the
peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned,"
and refusal to move on after being so ordered by a law enforcement officer. Once
again, compare this statute with the New York statute in Galpern, supra note 9.
54 42 Ala. App. 296, 161 So. 2d 796, rev'd, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
55 "There was no showing, however, of any connection between this [selective
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Court's majority found the applicable ordinances so broad that they
evoked constitutional doubts. Of these ordinances, section 1142 of
the Birmingham Code56 was being constitutionally interpreted by the
higher Alabama court, but the opinion57 had not been handed down
when the trial court decided the Shuttlesworth case; and under
Birmingham Code section 1231,58 no evidence of guilt existed if the
section was interpreted as the Alabama Court of Appeals had inter-
preted it." Once more the Court ignored the opportunity to shed
light on the power of the police.
Perhaps the Court had the police problem in mind when it said
Shuttlesworth was not a civil rights case, but one can hardly take this
seriously, despite the Court's statement. In addition to his national
leadership of a civil rights organization, Shuttlesworth was not a
stranger to the United States Supreme Court as a civil rights defen-
dant, nor was he merely standing on the sidewalk, as attorney Gal-
pern had been, for only moments before there had been a picketing
demonstration.
Thus far one sees that Galpern seemingly created a strong evi-
dentiary presumption in favor of police testimony which is applied
unless there has been a denial of a First Amendment right in a civil
rights setting. Under circumstances such as Shuttlesworth, the Court
will look at the statute or ordinance; but not in a case like Tinsley
where seemingly the facts and ordinance create at least as much of
a deprivation of one's civil liberties.
CONDUCT WHICH MAY BREACH THE PEACE
Closely related in spirit to the above, but exhibiting another
aspect of Galpern, is the view that conduct, otherwise lawful, be-
comes unlawful when it may result in a breach of the peace from an
undescribed source. In Galpern, Officer Falchiere had the authority,
as the New York Court of Appeals decided, to order Galpern to move
on, regardless of the fact that he was doing no more than standing
and conversing on a public sidewalk. Recall that no evidence showed
that the use of the sidewalk by any other person was hampered at
buying] campaign and the presence of the petitioner and his companions outside the
department store .... " Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, supra note 54, at
90 n.3.
56 Bia mNGHAm, ALA., GENERAL CITY CODE § 1142 (1944) states: "It shall be
unlawful for any person or any number of persons to so stand, loiter or walk upon
any street or sidewalk in the city as to obstruct free passage over, on or along said
street or sidewalk. It shall also be unlawful for any person to stand or loiter upon any
street or sidewalk of the city after being requested by any police officer to move on."
57 Middlebrooks v. City of Birmingham, 42 Ala. App. 525, 170 So. 2d 424 (1964).
58 BIRMINGHAm, ALA., GENERAL CITY CODE § 1231 (1944).
59 Phifer v. City of Birmingham, 42 Ala. 282, 160 So. 2d 898 (1963).
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the time. Neither did any evidence show from where such a breach
might come, nor whether that source had anything to do with Gal-
pern, if it was to come from a specific source. Such reasoning is per-
haps most dramatically exemplified by Thomas v. Mississippi.6" In
this case the defendant, the first freedom-rider tried in a Mississippi
court of record,6' entered the Continental Trailways bus terminal at
Jackson, Mississippi where the police sign immediately outside the
waiting room carefully designated the room for whites only "by order
of the police." Although he neither said nor did anything inflamma-
tory, the police testified that the crowd in the station was hostile.
A police officer twice ordered Thomas to leave. He refused and was
thereafter arrested for breach of the peace.6" Mississippi's Supreme
Court unanimously held that the defendant's right to travel unham-
pered in interstate commerce was not sufficient to outweigh the
State's interest in the preservation of order.63 One cannot help asking
whether the "order" that the court talked about preserving was social
order and not the one requiring peace on the streets.
As a result of the Thomas ruling, the highest Mississippi court
came into direct conflict with the highest Arkansas court. Previously
the highest Arkansas court had decided Briggs v. State,64 like
Thomas, a civil rights case, but one not so prominent. In Briggs there
was a consolidation of three criminal prosecutions against thirteen
defendants. While all involved lunch-counter sit-ins, there were three
different factual situations. In the first, the defendants refused to
leave when so ordered by the police officers; no such order being
given by the restaurant management. In the second; the defendants
left when requested to do so by the management. In the third, upon
a similar request by management, the defendants refused to leave
the premises. All of the defendants were convicted of breaching the
60 248 Miss. 850, 160 So. 2d 657, rev'd, 380 U.S. 524, - Miss. -, 170 So. 2d
258 (1965).
61 Under Mississippi law, as in other states, the first appeal from an order of a
magistrate or justice of the peace is a trial de novo in a court of record.
62 Defendant was convicted under Miss. CODE § 2087.5 (1942), which says:
"Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or under circumstances such
that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby: (1) crowds or congregates
with others in or upon . . . any other place of business engaged in selling or servicing
members of the public . . . and who fails or refuses to disperse and move on . . .
when ordered by any law enforcement officer . . . ." Again see the similarity to the
New York statute and particularly the words "or under circumstances such that a
breach may be occasioned thereby."
63 Thomas v. State, 248 Miss. 850, 160 So. 2d 657 (1964). At the actual trial the
police testimony was quite vague as to the actual hostility of the crowd since a large
number of those who were in the station at that time were either police or reporters
and photographers. Furthermore, one of the police captains stated the police had the
situation under control. Despite this the Jackson jury convicted and the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed.
64 236 Ark. 596, 367 S.W.2d 750 (1965).
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peace6 5 and, in addition, those involved in the third situation were
convicted under an Arkansas statute that made it a misdemeanor
for failure to leave a business establishment when requested to do so
by the management.66 In reversing the convictions for breach of the
peace, the Arkansas court very perceptively stated:
The point that we wish to make completely clear is that the mere fact
that the exercise of a lawful right may result in a disturbance or a
breach of the peace does not make the exercise of that right a violation
of the law so long as the right is exercised in a peaceful manner and
without force or violence or threats of same.6 7
Although the court did not talk in terms of police power versus in-
dividual right, its recognition that the defendant must evince a
wrongful intent before he may be found guilty of a crime is signifi-
cant, simple though it sounds.
When the United States Supreme Court reversed Thomas68 and
Callendar v. Florida,6 9 the Court relied upon Boynton v. Virginia7 0
which had been decided five years earlier. During a stopover, Boyn-
ton (a Negro) was refused service in the white section of a restau-
rant located on the premises of the Richmond, Virginia bus terminal.
After refusing to move to the colored section, Boynton was arrested
for unlawfully being on the restaurant's premises. Holding that the
restaurant was subject to and had violated the Interstate Commerce
Act, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 71
Clearly the Supreme Court's disposition of Thomas rested on
quite narrow grounds, contrasted with the broader grounds used by
the Arkansas court in Briggs. Such narrow grounds, of course, have
no connection with Galpern; rather they rest on a civil rights base
in an interstate commerce framework. This is particularly surprising
in view of Wright v. Georgia, 7  decided two years before Thomas.
By reversing Thomas and Callendar without argument, merely on the
petitions for certiorari, the Court deprived all concerned of an analy-
sis of the police authority although the issue was clearly present in
those cases. Subsequent to the arrests in these two cases, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission had made its regulations concerning
65 ARx. STATS., § 41-1432 (Act 226 of 1959, § 1) makes creating disturbances or
breaches of the peace prohibited offenses.
66 ARK. STATS., § 41-1433 (Act. 14 of 1959, § 1).
67 236 Ark. 596, 601, 367 S.W.2d 750, 754 (1963).
68 Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524, 176 So. 2d 258 (1965).
69 380 U.S. 519 (1965).
70 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
71 Id. at 463.
72 217 Ga. 453, 122 S.E.2d 737, rev'd, 373 U.S. 284, 219 Ga. 125, 131 S.E.2d 851
(1963).
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bus travel far more stringent. No guidance was needed from the
Supreme Court on travel, but it is required on the use of police power
so clearly abused in Thomas and Callendar.
In Wright v. Georgia," six Negroes were convicted of disturb-
ing the peace for disobeying a police order to leave a public park
owned by the city and customarily used only by Whites. Wright
and the others had been playing basketball in an otherwise empty
park. In reversing the conviction,74 a unanimous Court said, "the
possibility of disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of persons
from a place if they otherwise have a constitutional right (founded
upon the equal protection clause) to be present. "75 Although limited
by the decision to cases coming under the equal protection clause,76
Wright could easily and justifiably have been applied to Thomas,
or any other case involving the right of an individual to be free of
police harassment.
To rely on Boynton, as the Court did in Thomas, and play the
game in the interstate commerce ball park, is to avoid deciding the
case on the important constitutional ground, and is clearly to miss
the point. No one can seriously believe that interstate commerce was
more than an accidental issue in Boynton, having nothing to do with
the real point, i.e., the illegal conduct of the police. Two ways, both
important, were open to the Court in Thomas, namely: (a) the equal
protection-due process route, since Negroes were being deprived by
the police of a facility available to whites; or (b) the negation of the
Galpern-civil liberties route, since a citizen has a right to stand peace-
fully in a public place free from interference without fear of harm or
arrest. Let us note, in any event, that the decision in Wright, valua-
ble as it is, although applying as it does only to the equal protection
clause, falls far short of the decision of the Arkansas court in Briggs,
which applied its protection to all "lawful" rights.
THE SPEECH-ACTION DISTINCTION
Another aspect of Galpern not favoring individual liberty is the
distinction between speech and action toward which Justice Black
73 Ibid.
74 The conviction was under GA. CODE ANN., § 26-5301 (1953) which says:
"Unlawful assemblies-Any two or more persons who shall assemble for the purpose
of disturbing the public peace or committing an unlawful act, and shall not disperse
upon being commanded to do so by a ...police officer, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor." Presumably Negro boys playing basketball on a court reserved for Whites,
may disturb someone's peace, but except for this mental disturbance, the act of the
Negro boys, playing basketball, could not seriously result in a conviction for a crime
requiring intent to commit one, as well as a refusal to disperse on police order.
75 373 U.S. at 293.
76 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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has been leading. This distinction is that peaceful action and speech
are different, and only the latter falls within the rights of the First
Amendment which are generally more zealously protected by the
Supreme Court than other constitutional rights. It is sad to realize
that this distinction, enunciated by Justice Black who is considered
an absolutist on the First Amendment, has become persuasive to a
possible majority of the Court. While the issue was not made
explicit in Galpern, the refusal to obey a police order, unless one has
a very good reason (e.g., a clear free speech problem) is implicit in
Judge Lehman's opinion." Justice Black's doctrine of distinction in
his concurrence-dissent in Cox7" has dramatically come to the fore in
Brown v. Louisiana.71
In Brown, five Negroes led by Henry Brown entered the reading
room of their local public library branch during its normal business
hours. The Branch Assistant was the only one present in the library
when they entered. The library system was segregated, with Negroes
normally not permitted in its branches; Negroes were relegated to
the "Blue Bookmobile." Brown asked the Branch Assistant for a
book. After looking in the card catalogue and not finding it, she
informed Brown that she would order it. At this point Brown
quietly sat down with his four associates grouped around him. As
Justice Fortas said, the drama started. After unsuccessfully asking
all five to leave, the Branch Assistant called in the Regional Li-
brarian who was nearby; the request was repeated, once more un-
successfully. Not long after the Negroes entered the library, the
sheriff, who had seen the group enter, and his deputies arrived.
When the sheriff's unexplained request to leave was also refused,
Brown and the others were arrested for breach of the peace on the
charge of refusing to leave a public building upon request of the
person in charge. They were found guilty of the charge.8" Affir-
mances in the Louisiana courts followed and certiorari was granted
by the United States Supreme Court.
In a 5-4 decision the United States Supreme Court reversed.8'
Uniting in a dissent by Justice Black, the minority of four appears
to find the speech-conduct distinction crucial in deciding the case.
At the beginning of his dissent Justice Black sets the tone of what
is to follow:
I do not believe that any provision of the United States Constitution
forbids any one of the 50 states of the Union, including Louisiana, to
77 People v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279, 181 N.E. 572, 83 A.L.R. 785 (1932).
78 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 575 (1964) (concurring and dissenting
opinion).
79 Brown v. Louisiana, 86 Sup. Ct. 719 (1966).
80 For the applicable statute, see supra note 53.
81 Brown v. Louisiana, 86 Sup. Ct. 719 (1966).
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make it unlawful to stage "sit-ins" or "stand-ups" in public libraries
for the purpose of advertising objections to the State's public policies.
82
Not only does the minority accept this distinction, but the opinion
goes on to give it the status of constitutional doctrine. Quite
incredibly, Mr. Justice Black says,
The prevailing opinion and to some extent the two separate concurring
opinions treat this case as though Louisiana was here attempting to
enforce a policy of denying Louisiana citizens the right to use the
State's libraries on account of race. . . .[T]here simply was no racial
discrimination practiced in this case.
8 3
This is said despite a record replete with evidence of discrimination:
counsel for Louisiana acknowledged that library cards were
stamped "Negro," and further that the building closed after this
incident.8"
In his concurring opinion, Justice White also appears to accept
the speech-conduct distinction, although he is not willing to decide
the case by rigidly applying it to these facts. "In my view," he
states, "the behavior of these petitioners and their use of the library
building, even though it was for the purpose of a demonstration, did
not depart significantly from what normal library use would con-
template."8 5 Justice White stands for reversal but indicates that
given a different version of this peaceful incident he would accept
the doctrine that peaceful action and speech are different and the
former is necessarily less protected than speech. Had a regulation
been in effect for the purpose of restricting Negro use of the library,
but as a result limiting white use also, Justice White might have
voted for affirming the conviction on the ground that it applies to all.
Can we not ask whether there is certain conduct beyond the power
of the statute or the authority of the police to regulate? Is not peace-
ful public behavior such conduct?8" This third progeny of Galpern,
the speech-action dichotomy, appears to have been accepted, at least
as highly persuasive, by a majority of the present Supreme Court.
While his opinion in Brown strongly favors reversing the con-
82 Id. at 729.
83 Id. at 733.
84 Id. at 722.
85 Id. at 729.
86 Id. at 723-24. As Justice Fortas said in his opinion: "We are here dealing
with an aspect of a basic constitutional right-the right under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments guaranteeing freedom of speech and of assembly, and freedom to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances .... As this Court has repeatedly
stated, these rights are not confined to verbal expressions. They embrace appropriate
types of actions which certainly include the right in a peaceful and orderly manner to
protest by silent and reproachful presence. In a place where the protestant has every
right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities."
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viction, Justice Fortas chose not to consider the constitutional issue
concerning the right of the police to ask persons behaving quietly in
a public place to leave during normal business hours. It is not clear
whether a different issue would be created by a specific, narrowly
drawn regulation concerning the length of time one or a number of
persons may remain in a small library, but Edwards so suggests.
Since the statute in Brown lacks any specific limitations, and is ap-
plicable to all alike, it gives to the police a sweeping power to remove
or arrest those not wanted. From his opening sentence it is clear that
Justice Fortas is thinking of civil rights and segregation of library
facilities and not of the more general problem, the right of a citizen
to be free and quiet in a public place. His opinion says that there
was no evidence that a breach of the peace might be "occasioned" by
the defendants' actions. He further states:
... [E]ven if the accused action were within the scope of the statutory
instrument, we would be required to assess the constitutional impact of
its application, and we would have to hold that the statute cannot
constitutionally be applied to punish petitioners' actions in the cir-
cumstances of this case.")8 7
The opinion, therefore, constitutes a strong affirmation of the right
to conduct a peaceful demonstration to end segregation, free from
official intervention.
Since apparently there was trouble fashioning a majority to
reverse the convictions of Brown and the others, it is probably unfair
to point to the omission of discussion of the law in the context of a
non-demonstration case, such as Galpern or Tinsley. At times Justice
Fortas comes close to a consideration of the Galpern doctrine:
"Without reference to the statute . . . petitioners' presence in the
library was unquestionably lawful. It was a public facility, open to
the public." ' But then he retreats from Galpern and goes back to
the racial aspect: "Negroes could not be denied access since white
persons were welcome."8 9 Had the case been decided on the right of
a citizen to be in a public place peacefully without fear of arrest,
instead of on the segregation problem, then the meager issue that
Justice Black makes concerning segregation in the library falls of its
own weight; it is irrelevant because all citizens may be there. If the
Court in Brown was as close to affirmation of the convictions as it
apparently was, even though no disturbance was shown, the future
for civil liberties cases based on peaceful demonstrations is bleak.
In order to uphold his absolute defense of freedom of speech
87 Id. at 724.
88 Id. at 722.
89 Ibid.
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and at the same time distinguish cases that bother him, Mr. Justice
Black seems to have developed the thought that under the First
Amendment speech and conduct are distinguishable. While this is not
the place to analyze why Mr. Justice Black has chosen to differ-
entiate between speech and conduct, it is less than reassuring that
under his current view the police, almost at whim, have the right to
remove persons peacefully occupying a building during business
hours. Justice Black bases his dissent on the right of Louisiana to
end demonstrations in the library. But it is difficult to visualize a
different opinion had Brown not been demonstrating but merely
standing or sitting in the library doing nothing, a common course of
conduct in libraries. In either situation the defendant, although
behaving peacefully, has refused to obey the order of the one in
charge.
Under such circumstances the power of the police becomes
unlimited. If there is a limitation on such power to end demonstra-
tions, where is it? How could conduct be more peaceful and thus
worthy of protection? Not even Judge Lehman in Galpern desired
unlimited police power; nor can Justice Black. But if Brown is a
case which four Justices see as warranting an affirmance of a con-
viction, whence would come the situation in which these four re-
spected Justices who dissented in Brown would vote to reverse?
Justice Brennan would throw out the statute as being too broad
in its scope. Since this statute is like that of New York and other
states, presumably others besides Louisiana might be affected, unless
the interpretation of their courts limited their statute to constitu-
tional scope. But if they all gather within their nets peaceful conduct
which should be protected under the Constitution, one then cannot
ignore Justice Brennan's position despite its effect on other similar
laws. Statutory versions and enlargements of common-law breach
of the peace have become so overly broad that hard examinations of
these must take place. Under common law breach of the peace, the
issue rested upon the conduct of the person charged. Our more
sophisticated moderns have added the conception of a crime for
failure to obey a police order.
Justice Brennan gently reminds us 0 that Justice Black dis-
sented in Feiner v. New York, 1 a case in which Feiner, while making
a public speech, called on Negroes to revolt. Feiner refused to dis-
continue his violent speech. After being arrested, charged, and con-
90 Id. at 728. ". . . [Als my Brother Black observed in Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315, 327 . . . 'courtesy and explanation of commands are basic elements . . . in
a democratic society.'" No such explanation was made by the sheriff in Brown.
91 340 U.S. 315 (1954).
19661
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
victed, his conviction was upheld by the United States Supreme
Court. To reconcile Justice Black's dissent in Feiner with his dissentin Brown is impossible. Feiner aroused people to the possibility of
violence, Brown did not.
While Mr. Justice Black apparently adheres to his absolute
position in constitutionally protecting speech, he has now so nar-
rowed the concept of speech that one wonders how much is left. For
example, would giving out leaflets at a meeting be speech or action?
While the leaflet may contain words exhorting the reader to accept
an idea, the distribution, it could be urged, is action separate and
apart from the content of the leaflet; thus the physical act of dis-
tribution is action or conduct, not speech, and hence is not worthy of
the same protection. Under these circumstances would Justice Black
and his strong minority say such acts are subject to the order of
police to move on and affirm an arrest made thereon?
Not much imagination is required to understand the full impact
of Justice Black's dissent in Brown, for he did say: "It is high time to
challenge the assumption ... that groups that think they have been
mistreated have a constitutional right to use the public streets,
buildings ... whenever they want, without regard to whom it may
disturb."92 He also said, "I think the evidence ... established every
element in the offense charged against petitioners."93 If Brown's
peaceful conduct established every element of the offense, then the
ordinary citizen, not protected by any semblance of First Amend-
ment activity (as in Tinsley) has no protection from a refusal to
obey a police order to move on, regardless of the basis for the
order.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AS GUIDELINES: THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
Not so much an off-shoot of Galpern, but rather a pretext for
upholding arrests, is the language of the statute under which Galpern
was convicted. As seen in some of the statutes and ordinances dis-
cussed above, other communities refer to "an intent to provoke a
breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be
occasioned ......
"Intent to commit a breach of the peace" is relatively specific
and seems to require some affirmative action to upset the tranquility
of the community. On the other hand, the phrase "or whereby a
breach of the peace may be occasioned" is not only distinct from the
"intent" phrase but would appear to express some kind of inactive
wrong-doing, as discussed in such cases as Thomas.
92 Brown v. Louisiana, 76 Sup. Ct. 719, 734 (1966).
93 Ibid.
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It is no wonder that the phrase has been seized upon in making
so many arrests in civil rights activities. One need only be present
and be disliked in order to be guilty. When briefs are submitted in
support of upholding such arrests, the New York statute referred
to in Galpern is cited in support of such a proposition. An innocent
party, not liked by others in the vicinity, is ordered to move on;
his arrest results when he fails to comply. Galpern is the prop with
which courts uphold convictions. After all, why not? The statutes
are similar and Galpern represents the view of the New York Court
of Appeals, a view which seems to come close to the conception that
one must move on when ordered by the police. The upshot of such
broad statutes; coupled with Galpern-style interpretations, is that a
breach of the peace may be occasioned by one's presence alone in the
particular area of concern to the police.
Whether this constitutes an improper delegation of judicial
power to the police, by making them the repository of the responsi-
bility to decide whether "A" is guilty of a crime because the police
officer thinks "B" may commit some improper act towards "A,"
may well be argued some future day in the courts. But more im-
portant is our present difficulty which results from allowing con-
victions to stand against persons who have committed no discernible
wrong-doing beyond standing where a police officer thought they had
no business to be, as in Galpern and Tinsley.
If convictions, such as in Galpern and Tinsley, and the all-
encompassing statutory phrasing associated with such convictions,
are allowed to stand regardless of the defendant's intent to breach
the peace, then the net effect is that the police officer decides who is
guilty. It is not one's conduct that determines guilt or innocence,
rather it is the policeman's subjective judgment. Such statutory
phrasing does not advise one when he is in danger of committing a
crime; it merely tells him he had better move when told to do so, or
risk arrest. Since the phrase in the statute "occasioned thereby"
does not advise one what constitutes the wrong-doing, and since
"intent" is not a necessary element of the crime, all that is left of
the element of the crime is the failure to move on when told.
In Galpern the trial judge acknowledged that the defendant had
no intent to commit a breach of peace and the record does not dis-
close the defendant being properly advised what breach of the peace
would have been occasioned by his presence on the sidewalk. Tinsley
is even more difficult to understand. Seemingly no objective standard
existed. Does the situation settle down, then, to laws where one is
practically automatically guilty if he fails to move on as ordered,
regardless of the circumstances, and regardless of the officer being
nervous or authoritarian?
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Nor are the civil rights cases discussed above of any analytic
help. Where there is an overriding reason, such as civil rights, then
the Supreme Court seems to reverse the conviction on the basis,
generally, that there has been a denial of equal protection of the law.
Let there be no such important consideration and although our citi-
zen may be even more peaceful than a singing civil rights demon-
strator, he is nevertheless guilty.
Of the cases discussed above each could have been decided on
the ground that no wrongful intent or wrongful act was exhibited
by the defendant; accordingly no right lay in the police to force him
to move on. Had such a test of wrongful intent been applied, then
probably the civil rights cases and the Galpern case would have had
the same result, because in many such cases the proof would show
that the defendant had no intent to commit a breach of the peace, nor
would any have been occasioned by anything the defendant did. A
generally different result has occurred in these cases because different
standards are applied under different circumstances to the same or
similar conduct. Tinsley and Galpern were convicted. The others
were not. Our courts have properly recognized the need to protect
the Browns, but not the Tinsleys. While it is important to protect
those who exercise First Amendment rights in a dramatic fashion
before the glare of publicity, that good is diminished if police are
allowed to arrest and convict peaceful citizens who assert a right
not to move because the order was improper. Certainty in the law is
not encouraged by such variable factors, nor is the conception en-
hanced that the law ought to be equitable.
At some time a free society must defend not only the headline
case but also the simple right to stand peacefully in a public place,
unless there exists a substantial interest of the state to forbid such
conduct. Privacy has been defended as to acts in our homes and in
our bedrooms.94 Cannot one say that the citizen who commits no
wrongful act should have at least a similar right to be free of the
duty of explaining one's peaceful presence in a public place? It is
the duty of the courts to define and protect the public conduct so
that only under very limited circumstances may one be ordered from
the street when his conduct is beyond reproach. Until the courts
determine the rights and limits of the policeman in a particular
instance to direct citizens to move on, and until consideration is given
to what the citizen was actually doing, not what the police officer
thought the presence of the citizen would do, ordinary persons who
become rightfully stubborn at a police order will continue to have
no protection.
94 Griswold v. Connecticut, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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One must either exhibit an intent to commit a breach of the
peace, or his conduct, not his mere presence, must be such as to cause
a reasonable person to believe that a breach was about to be com-
mitted. Under such a test not only would the civil rights cases have
been decided the same way, but Galpern and Tinsley probably would
have been reversed, as they should have been.
A policeman's lot is not a happy one, but arresting the Galperns
of this world cannot make it happier. Patrolling the streets of a large
city is difficult and often dangerous. The crowds are large, sometimes
rude and unruly, and decisions must be made; but the harmless
"schmooser" like Galpern is not the one who should be arrested.
Respect for the law is not engendered in this fashion; rather the
unfortunate gulf between much of the citizenry and the police is
widened and the "we-they" attitude encouraged.
In sum, the first off-shoot of Galpern is that a police officer's
order is prima facie correct. This remains the law unless an im-
portant issue such as a First Amendment freedom has been denied,
or the applicable statute was or could actually have been unconsti-
tutionally applied in the factual situation. Limited Supreme Court
holdings have left Galpern's second off-shoot, the view that conduct
otherwise lawful becomes unlawful when it may result in a breach
of peace, largely intact. Finally, the third off-shoot, the distinction
between speech and conduct, may well have won over a majority of
the present Supreme Court. Yet in light of Galpern's questionable
validity today, the admitted unfamiliarity of police officers with
current laws,95 and general policy considerations, it is time to bury
Galpern, and all its progeny forever.
The reasonableness of the evidentiary presumption in favor of
the policeman's testimony is open to serious doubt. We have seen
Arkansas Judge Cates' strong stand against this presumption.
Indeed, we have seen that this evidentiary presumption renders the
defendant presumptively guilty (rather than presumptively inno-
cent) in a disorderly conduct or breach of the peace case. As dis-
cussed above, fairness and equity require that the defendant's guilt
be established beyond a reasonable doubt by the state without em-
ploying this presumption. Fairness and equity require that judges
wrestle with the problems inherent in balancing the individual's
right and society's interests without resorting to the escape of this
evidentiary presumption. Ending the use of such an evidentiary pre-
sumption would serve to clarify a nebulous area of the law, thereby
offering guidance to police officers in the performance of their
duties,96 and to individuals in their daily conduct.
95 TOWLER, THE ROLE IN RACIAL CONFLICTS 15 (1964).
96 Middlebrooks v. City of Birmingham, 42 Ala. App. 25, 170 So. 2d 424 (1964).
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The reasonableness of the principle that otherwise lawful
conduct is punishable if it may result in a breach of the peace is
equally open to serious doubt. The exercise of one's lawful rights
should not be limited by the hypothetical consequences of the exer-
cise. The State has a duty to allow the individual to exercise all his
lawful rights, not merely his rights under the equal protection clause
or his rights specifically derived from the Constitution. Unless there
is a clear showing that the exercise of these rights will cause a harm
that clearly outweighs the harm caused by their abridgment, the
state should have no right to abridge them. The rule of the Briggs
case is that merely because exercise of a lawful right may result in a
disturbance is not alone sufficient to breach the peace. This rule is
just, equitable, and necessary in a society that is keenly protective
of individual rights.
The fact that Brown nearly resulted in an affirmance of the con-
victions demonstrates the unreasonableness of the speech-conduct
distinction. What possible justifiable basis in law can there be for
holding the conduct of the Negroes involved in sitting in a public
library punishable by law?
The statute was deliberately and purposely applied solely to terminate
the reasonable, orderly, and limited exercise of the right to protest the
unconstitutional segregation of a public facility. Interference with
this right, so exercised, by state action is intolerable under our Con-
stitution.97
Brown graphically demonstrates that the speech-conduct distinction,
which summarily concludes that conduct is worthy of fewer protec-
tions than speech, is a dangerous doctrine. Men who peacefully seek
through reasonable means to bring to the public's attention a denial
of rights may find the law, from which they seek support, attacking
them with brutal force. While there may be conduct that is not
worthy of First Amendment protection, drawing such a line between
speech and action is artificial and can only lead to a denial of the
communication of ideas.
Many similar cases require the prosecution to prove that the
police order was warranted and made necessary by the conduct of
the defendant without obtaining the benefit of such an evidentiary
presumption. Merely because an exercise of a lawful right might
lead to a breach of the peace is insufficient in these cases to prove the
order warranted.
An arrest following refusal to obey an unwarranted police order
should properly be characterized as unlawful. Traditionally the
remedy, although of doubtful effect, for an unlawful arrest has been
97 Brown v. Louisiana, 76 Sup. Ct. 719, 724 (1966) (Opinion of Justice Fortas).
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a civil suit for damages against the individual officer; sometimes
criminal penalties are also attached. A far more effective and ap-
propriate remedy was recommended in 1954 by the California Bar
Association Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure.9" The Com-
mittee called for the establishment of
* . . [A] new kind of civil action, or better a summary type of pro-
ceeding, for a substantial money judgment in favor of the wronged
individual . .. and against the political subdivision whose enforcement
officers violated the person's rights. After not many outlays of public
funds the taxpayers and administrative heads will insist upon curbing
unlawful police action.99
Much has been done to protect the individual's right to coun-
sel' and his protection from unlawful searches and seizures' °1 in
recent years. While the present civil rights struggle may have ob-
scured the problem presented by Galpern, the 5-4 decision in Brown
indicates the tenuousness of relying upon the racial nature of a case
to obtain reversal. Furtherance of individual liberty, now in danger
because Justice Black seems to hold a possible majority for his
conduct-speech distinction, must be stressed under newer banners
to meet the newer attacks upon it. Hopefully the discussion herein
raises questions for consideration and will produce modem solutions.
98 Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization,
51 J. CRin. L., C. & P.S. 395 (1960) at 400-01.
99 Ibid. See also Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights,
39 Mn'rz. L. REV. 493 (1955) and Wilson, supra note 98, at 400.
100 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
101 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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